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In Alzheimer’s disease (AD), pathological processes start in the brain long before clinical dementia. Biomarkers reﬂecting brain
alterations may therefore indicate disease at an early stage, enabling early diagnosis. This raises several ethical questions and the
potential beneﬁts of early diagnosis must be weighted against possible disadvantages. Currently, there are few strong arguments
favouring early diagnosis, due to the lack of disease modifying therapy. Also, available diagnostic methods risk erroneous
classiﬁcations, with potentially grave consequences. However, a possible beneﬁt of early diagnosis even without disease modifying
therapy is that it may enable early decision making when patients still have full decision competence, avoiding problems of
hypothetical consents. It may also help identifying patients with cognitive dysfunction secondary to other diseases that may be
responsive to treatment already today.
1.Introduction
Much research has been devoted to ﬁnding reliable methods
for early diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The most
promising diagnostic modalities are cerebrospinal ﬂuid
(CSF) and imaging biomarkers. This research area is largely
motivated by the ongoing development of disease-modifying
treatment. When available, such treatment will likely be
most eﬀective if initiated early in the disease process, before
too much irreversible damage has been inﬂicted on the
brain.Earlydiagnosisinconjunctionwithdisease-modifying
treatment will form a preventive strategy. Classically, dis-
ease prevention is divided into primary, secondary, and
tertiary prevention. Primary prevention is the reduction of
risk factors to prevent disease from occurring. Secondary
prevention is the detection of presymptomatic disease and
early start of treatment to halt disease progression. Tertiary
prevention is the prevention of disease progression in
patients with symptomatic disease. Each prevention type
brings speciﬁc medical, ethical, and organizational prob-
lems. Diagnosis and treatment of incipient AD in patients
with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) would constitute
a tertiary prevention, which arguably is the most realistic
future scenario. Secondary prevention implies detecting AD
pathologyandinitiatingtreatmentinasymptomaticpatients.
Such intervention at a stage of little brain deterioration is
intuitively tempting, but the low prevalence of incipient
AD in the general population makes the strategy extremely
problematic [1].
The general outcome of a prevention program depends
on the eﬀectiveness of the diagnostic tests and treatments
used, wherefore results diﬀer greatly between medical condi-
tions. For example, secondary prevention with screening for
cervical cancer in asymptomatic females is quite successful
[2], while the eﬀect of secondary prevention of prostate
cancer remains debated [3]. With the current lack of
disease-modifying AD therapy, few strong arguments favour
early AD diagnosis in clinical routine, although this could
change within a foreseeable future. Ethical issues of early
AD diagnosis should therefore be discussed both to tackle
present problems and to prepare health care professionals
for a possible future of disease-modifying therapy. Here we2 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
will review ethical considerations of early AD diagnosis. We
will mainly discuss consequences for clinical practice, but it
should be noted that extended use of early diagnosis might
beneﬁt research, since it would likely lead to involvement of
more patients in clinical studies. Certain medical conditions
present unique ethical considerations, and for dementia
these include personal identity and decision-making compe-
tence.
2 .T h eE t h ic so fU n c e rt ain ty
For any negative consequence of an erroneous test, one
should consider how often misdiagnosis occurs. Several
studies show high diagnostic accuracy of CSF biomarkers
for incipient AD in MCI, with sensitivity and speciﬁcity
around 85–90% [4, 5]. This is likely an upper limit when
validating tests towards clinical diagnosis of probable AD,
since the clinical diagnosis is not always conﬁrmed upon
autopsy. However, even a test with a diagnostic accuracy of
90% results in a large number of misdiagnosed persons if the
disease prevalence is 50%, which is the typical prevalence of
AD in MCI cohorts. Increased speciﬁcity may be achieved
if testing is restricted to a high-risk group, for example,
APOE ε4 carriers. However, since approximately 50% of
AD patients lack APOE ε4[ 6], the increased speciﬁcity
would be at the cost of a reduced overall sensitivity. The
diagnostic lumbar puncture could be uncomfortable. Severe
complications are extremely rare, but postlumbar puncture
headache occurs in 2–4% of the patients [7–9].
A test result indicating AD may bring extended followup
and stigmatization resulting in feelings of hopelessness,
agony, and despair. There might be an increased risk of
suicide in dementia, although it is unclear if this is linked
to the stigma of diagnosis or caused by mood disorders
secondary to the disease itself [10]. From a legal perspective,
a test result indicating AD could aﬀect insurance premiums,
and the rights to hold a driver’s license or own a gun could
be questioned. Repeated assessment of competence could be
humiliating. This is ethically problematic even in correctly
diagnosed AD cases and the ethical consequences in falsely
diagnosed cases could be grave. On the other hand, a correct
early diagnosis may be clarifying and appreciated by patients
even without disease-modifying treatment, and a diagnosis
could be valuable since it allows informed planning for the
future [11] as we discuss further below. In practice, the
attitudes of clinicians vary widely, and some may ﬁnd it very
diﬃcult to “break the bad news” [12, 13].
AD not only concerns the patient but also his or her
relatives. An unambiguous diagnosis is likely to beneﬁt the
relatives of demented patients [14]. However, it is possible
that the worries of ﬁrst-grade relatives could extend to
their own health status and raise demands for further
presymptomatic testing [15].
3. Consequences of Early Diagnosis
Studies in MCI patients have not shown signiﬁcant beneﬁts
of early treatment with currently available drugs, but those
studies have been conducted on unselected MCI patients.
Thus, eﬀects on early AD may be blurred by non-AD MCI
patients, and future studies should preferably be conducted
on populations enriched for incipient AD. Presently, it is
diﬃcult to fully estimate the eﬀects of early treatment, and
thus of early diagnosis. However, even without treatment,
an early diagnosis might facilitate introduction of tools to
help the patient to cope with the progressive decline. In some
instances,adiagnosismightalsomakeiteasierforthepatient
to receive assistance from the health care system.
If a false positive diagnosis results in treatment, any
harmful side eﬀect is a serious infringe on the basic medical
ethics principle of nonmaleﬁcience, summarized in the
Latin phrase primum non nocere (“ﬁrst, do not harm”).
The risk of serious adverse eﬀects from treatments under
development should not be underestimated, considering
the meningoencephalitis cases in the AN1792 trial [16].
Although toxicity studies for new drugs are rigorous, rare
side eﬀects are only noticed with widespread use. Treatment
could also be expensive for patients or society, depending
on the local health care funding system. Obviously any
investment will be a dead loss in falsely positive cases.
Therefore, positive eﬀects of treatment must be weighted
against side eﬀects and treatment cost, when determining
decision limits for the diagnostic tests.
Early diagnosis might aﬀect the health of an early-
stage AD patient, besides treatment eﬀects. As mentioned,
detection of incipient AD could question the right to hold
a driver’s license. It is not known whether mild dementia
increases the risk for road accidents. A recent Cochrane
systematic review concluded that knowledge is scarce regard-
ing beneﬁts of driver assessment in the elderly for reducing
motor vehicle accidents [17]. Implications of early diagnosis
could diﬀer between cultures with diﬀerent roles of the
elderlyinfamiliesandsociety.Hypothetically,earlydiagnosis
may be more beneﬁcial in individualistic societies, where
the cognitive deﬁcient elderly are less supported by their
families and have more to gain from early intervention from
the health care system. Ultimately, each patient deserves a
personal ethical analysis before disclosing an early diagnosis,
and it is crucial to involve the patient in this process [18].
Abeneﬁcialconsequenceofinvestigationsaimingatearly
diagnosis is that they may guide the physician right in the
diagnostic algorithms. For example, a test result that does
not suggest AD in a patient with mild memory deﬁcits may
spur the clinician to look more intensely for other causes
of cognitive dysfunction, such as depression, hypothyreosis,
and neuroborreliosis. These conditions are all responsive to
treatment and must be identiﬁed. Test results that do not ﬁt
the clinical picture may also identify patients that should be
investigated further and/or be referred to a colleague for a
second opinion.
4. PersonalIdentityandDecision-Making
Competence in AD
So far, we have raised some ethical issues concerning
early AD diagnosis. There are risks associated with the
uncertainty of the available diagnostic tools and treatments,
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whether correctly or not. We now turn to the philosophically
more intricate matter of ethical issues enlightened by the
particular nature of AD.
The cognitive and neurological eﬀects of AD hit us where
it hurts: at the very core of our personality. Ever since the
writings of John Locke (1689) [19], psychological continuity
has been widely regarded as essential to personal identity
(see Derek Parﬁt’s inﬂuential book for a thorough discussion
in [20]). It is because of psychological continuity that we
remain one and the same person throughout our lives. Loss
of memory and of memory function and a general change
of cognitive capacities consequentially aﬀect our personality
and shake our sense of identity. For many people, such a
change presents a nightmarish scenario. Some even state
that they would rather die prematurely than live out their
life with a severe, personality changing, cognitive disorder.
This stated preference is of considerable interest in itself; as
mentioned above, the risk of a depressive or even suicidal
reaction to a diagnosis should be taken into account. But
it also demonstrates a more general problem: There is a
potential conﬂict between my current wishes for my future
self, and the actual wishes of my future self. What I want for
myself if the disease progresses might not be what I want as
it progresses.
Normally when we make decisions that aﬀect our future
selves, we assume some relevant similarity between our
current psychological state and set of preferences and those
of our future selves. We decide to quit smoking, for instance,
because it is in our predictable future interest not to
be addicted to smoking. We invest money so that our
future selves will reap the beneﬁts, and we predict that
our future self will still be interested in having money to
spend. Occasionally, this strategy backﬁres and we misjudge
the needs and interest of our future selves. Nevertheless,
the trend seems reliable enough for this strategy to be a
reasonable one: the practice of deciding for future selves has
a decent track record. If we had less psychological continuity
than we in fact do, things would be diﬀerent and we would
probably be wise to live more “in the moment”.
Normally, when I make a decision that aﬀects my future
self, my future self has some power to veto that decision, and
to inﬂuence its consequences. I can cancel dinner plans when
a current headache makes it in my best interest not to act on
former intentions.
In the case under consideration—early diagnosis of
AD—we make decisions about a future self that is impor-
tantly not like us. Depending on the severity of the eﬀects of
thedisease(andthetreatment),thefuturememighthavefew
interests in common with present me. Too few, in fact, of my
present preferences are to be a reliable guide to what future
me wants. My present preferences might therefore be held
to have less weight, and less authority. Perhaps my current
preferences should not have authority as to what happens to
future me, when the discontinuity is signiﬁcant. Most of our
decisions are covertly conditional on this kind of event not
happening.
An early diagnosis makes it possible to make arrange-
ments for a decline in cognitive capacities. Early diagnosis
of what may result in a profound personality change needs,
of course, to be coupled with information of what type of
change is to be expected. As noted, one of the beneﬁts of
early diagnosis is that the patients can prepare in a suitable
manner, by making their lives easier in order to cope with
the advancing disease, and also to put oﬀ the symptoms
and to get the help they need. But one potential drawback
here is that the earlier the diagnosis, the greater the potential
psychological distance between the agent who makes the
decision and the person whom this decision ultimately
aﬀects. There are two kinds of ethical problems with this
scenario.First,wemightmisjudgewhatliesinourfuturebest
interest. Second, a radical change in personality might mean
that there is a conﬂict between respecting the current agent’s
autonomy and that of the future agent.
5. Decision-MakingCompetence, Substituted
Judgments, andHypothetical Consent
One major beneﬁt of early diagnosis is that it enables us
to make rational decisions about what should happen to us
once we have lost the ability to decide rationally. In the most
dramatic cases, we can be informed about and give consent
to treatments that we might later, in a less rational state,
not understand the importance of. If we know that we are
at high risk of losing certain capacities, we can make our
wishes known, draw up a will, and make other preparations.
This way we avoid the practical and theoretical quagmire
of hypothetical consent, when caregivers have to guess what
the patient would have wanted. According to the substituted
judgment standard [21], if an agent loses the ability to make
a critical decision, we should aim to substitute the judgment
that the agent would have made, had he or she been capable.
There is however a problem that applies both to the kinds
of cases when we have to substitute a judgment and the
cases when we listen to the patients’ earlier decisions and
preferences: what stage of the agent should we listen to? If
we try to approximate the decision that the agent would have
made, if rational, which stage of the agent are we supposed
to approximate? Should we listen to an early decision, made
by the patient when he/she is clearly competent, or the
“latest” decision, made just before the patient is judged
unﬁt/incapable to decide on his/her own? The latter option
would be closer to the actual person aﬀected by the decision,
but the former is more likely to be the rational, well-
informed choice. The principle of autonomy might be in
conﬂict with what is in the patient’s best interest here. Even
though the ﬁrst option involves respecting the autonomy of
the agent in earlier stages, it is not clear that the agent should
have authority over later stages of him/herself when there is
a substantial personal change involved.
How do we want to be treated as the disease progresses?
To give a proper assessment of this issue, the scenario to
imagine is not only how we would want to be treated if we
get the disease, but also how we would want to be treated if
we found out that we actually, now,s u ﬀer from it, and that
we made some decisions earlier about what should happen
to us. Would we want those decisions to have authority over
our current preferences?4 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
How should we deal with interpersonal conﬂict of this
nature? Is the agent whose best interest we should have
in mind only the agent that might, in fact, be aﬀected by
the decision? In that case, perhaps we should take earlier
stages of the agent into account only if the current stage is
temporary, as we do when it comes to temporary insanity or
drunkenness.
We oﬀer no solutions to these problems here, but the
complications noted mean that we need to be clear about
what is involved when faced with an early diagnosis of a
predictable change in personality.
6. Conclusions
Several essential questions of ethical implications with early
AD diagnosis are unanswered. Perhaps most importantly,
knowledge is scarce on how patients actually react to
early diagnosis [22]. Further, the ethical implications will
change dramatically when disease-modifying drugs become
available. Depending on cost, safety, and eﬃcacy, such drugs
may transform patients’ views on an AD diagnosis from a
despair reaction to statements like “I am glad that my doctor
found out before I lost too many brain cells”. Any disease-
modifying treatment will be necessary to evaluate from a
cost-beneﬁtperspective.Thiswillbeaquestionforclinicians,
politicians, philosophers, and the society as a whole.
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